

Fertilizer Chemical Toxicity And ESG Risk: Evidence From Indian Brsr Disclosures (Fy23-25)

¹Dr. Chandrakant Kushwaha , ^{2*} Ritesh Ranjan Singh ³ Sameer Kumar, ⁴ Vishal Trivedi⁵ Harshit Tripathi,⁶ Dr. Lav Tripathi

¹University of Lucknow Email: Kushwaha_ck@lkouniv.ac.in Orcid: 0009-0001-9885-8464,

^{2*}University of Lucknow ²Email: rs2024comm_ritesh@lkouniv.ac.in Orcid: 0009-0000-9874-831

³, University of Lucknow Email: rs2024comm_sameer@lkouniv.ac.in , ,

⁴ University of Lucknow Email: Rs2023comm_vishal@lkouniv.ac.in , ,

⁵University of Lucknow Email: Rs2023comm_harshit@lkouniv.ac.in, Tata Consultancy Services

⁶University of Lucknow Email: way2lav@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This research investigates the influence of chemical toxicity from fertilizer production on ESG performance among India's leading agrochemical companies, utilizing three years of mandatory BRSR disclosures spanning FY23 to FY25. India's fertilizer industry, valued at ₹2.5 lakh crore and essential for feeding 1.4 billion people, creates substantial environmental challenges through GHG emissions, effluent discharge, hazardous waste generation, and groundwater contamination that erode corporate sustainability credentials. Through panel analysis of 10 NSE-listed firms representing 65% of sector market capitalization, we developed a composite toxicity index from standardized Principle 6 environmental metrics and examined its correlation with CRISIL ESG ratings.

Our analysis identifies a robust inverse relationship between toxicity profiles and ESG outcomes, with emission intensity exerting the strongest influence. Companies implementing zero-liquid discharge systems secure substantial ESG score gains averaging 20 points, while persistent high-toxicity operations trigger investor aversion and higher borrowing costs. Paradeep Phosphates stands as a compelling case study, converting environmental stewardship into market leadership, complemented by Deepak Fertilisers practical strategies for emission mitigation.

Bridging financial toxicology concepts with stakeholder theory, the study demonstrates how toxicity disclosures serve as critical signals of governance quality to institutional investors. These insights hold particular urgency as SEBI rolls out BRSR Core requirements with compulsory third-party assurance commencing FY26. Policymakers receive evidence supporting reallocation of the ₹20,000 crore Production-Linked Incentive scheme toward low-toxicity biofertilizer innovation. Corporate leaders gain actionable intelligence: each 10% toxicity reduction delivers tangible ESG uplift and financial premium, positioning compliant firms advantageously within expanding \$40 trillion global ESG capital pools.

Keywords: ESG performance, BRSR disclosures, financial toxicology, fertilizer toxicity, zero-liquid discharge, chemical emissions, stakeholder theory, SEBI regulations, environmental compliance, agrochemical sustainability

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1. INTRODUCTION

The agricultural economy in India is also one of the most important as it gives about 18% of the national GDP and employs more than 45% of the labor force, being also deadly reliant on the fertilizer industry estimated at ₹2.5 lakh crore in FY24 (Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, 2024). This sector relies on 1.4 billion people on nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers, but creates a great amount of environmental toxicity, averaging 0.6 tonnes CO₂ equivalent/tonne product, 1.2 million liters/day effluent release, and 2,100 metric tons of toxic waste per year across large companies (SEBI BRSR Disclosures, 2024). The Securities and Exchange Board of India introduced mandatory Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) in FY23, compelling the top 1,000 listed companies to disclose standardized environmental metrics and creating an unprecedented dataset linking chemical toxicity to corporate performance (SEBI, 2021).

Although in the toxicology literature, health effects such as pesticide poisoning, which has claimed 11,000 lives every year, and groundwater nitrate contamination, which has impacted 20 million hectares, are documented (NCRB, 2023), the literature on commerce scholarship does not consider the financial toxicology, which is the economic cost of toxicity-related penalties, compliance costs, and invest. The high-toxicity firms are punished by ESG ratings, which are becoming crucial in access to capital, with global ESG assets amounting to \$40 trillion where the chemicals industry ranks at 45/100 versus 70/100 in the pharmaceutical industry (CRISIL ESG Matrix, 2024). The present research fills the crucial research gap related to the impacts of fertilizer chemical toxicity on the ESG performance of the Indian agrochemical firms through the BRSR disclosures as the natural experiment data.

1.1 Problem Statement and Research Gap

*Author for Correspondence: Kushwaha_ck@lkouniv.ac.in

Conventional toxicology considers human and environmental endpoints like LD50 and NOAEL values, and commerce considers financial performance (ROE and market capitalization) separately. Interdisciplinary connection of toxicity as an ESG risk factor has not been discussed in India, although there are experiences all over the world where European fertilizer giants cut their emissions by a quarter under the influence of ESG, and their value increased by 12% (S&P Global, 2024). The BRSR framework of the Principle 6 standard of SEBI standardizes 17 environmental metrics, including GHG intensity (tCO₂/tonne), effluent volume (ML/day), and hazardous waste (MT), making it possible to quantify them, which was not done in previous Indian research (SEBI, 2021).

The literature available is afflicted by three main limitations. First, there is a lack of standardization of pre-BRSR data in FY 22 and prior. Secondly, the research is micro-level in that it does not consider composite toxicity, but on individual pollutants. Third, the qualitative methods do not address firm-level ESG correlations. The implementation of zero-liquid discharge technology by Paradeep Phosphates increased its ESG score by 55 to 75, which is causal and needs to be systematically demonstrated among peer companies (S&P Global, 2024). This paper bridges this gap by panel analysis of 10 NSE listed companies that represents 65% of market capitalization in the sector.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

The research incorporates the Stakeholder Theory of environmental risk which postulates that investors punish environmental risks (Freeman, 1984) and the Signalling Theory in that the toxicity disclosures are a signal of the quality of governance (Spence, 1973). The financial toxicology model suggests the following causal pattern: Toxicity causes compliance costs, which causes poorer ESG scores, stricter capital limits, and thus poor ROE. Empirical evidence is obtained in Deepak Fertilisers where 20% decrease in GHG was associated with 8% increase in ROE (Deepak Fertilisers BRSR, 2024).

1.3 Significance of the Study

The study provides valuable academic value because it provides the first quantitative association of BRSR toxicity measures to the performance of ESG, and expands the notions of financial toxicology to the new markets. The methodology, with a composite toxicity index based on standardized disclosures, offers a replicable approach to more than 50 chemical companies.

The cost of capital is a 5 to 10% higher increase in cost of capital, documenting the investor penalty by 15 to 20-point ESG differentials. Paradeep Phosphates ZLD can be considered as a feasible blueprint with a 20-point ESG gain with a ₹50 crore investment, and Insecticides India 40% reduction of chemicals marks viability to transition to agrochemicals (Paradeep Phosphates ESG Factbook, 2024; Insecticides India Sustainability Report, 2024).

The relevance of policy promotes the BRSR Core implementation of SEBI to be effective in FY26 through

the establishment of the required key performance indicators on toxicity that are assured. The scheme Production-Linked Incentive with its ₹20,000 crore allocation ought to focus on low-toxicity biofertilizers, which are estimated to result in a 25% decrease in costs by 2030 (Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, 2024). These findings can be used by the Ministry to revise the National Fertilizer Policy 2025.

1.4 Indian Context and Urgency

Uttar Pradesh, which takes a quarter of the national share of fertilizers, is the state with the largest number of pesticide toxicity cases, which further increases commercial interests (Ministry of Agriculture, 2024). BRSR Core by SEBI requires third-party assurance beginning FY26, which will increase the compliance burden of non-compliant companies. Indian laggards risk capital flight as ESG funds increase 25% year-over-year because competitors like Nutrien (Canada) and Yara (Norway) are able to achieve 30% emissions reductions via green ammonia technology (S&P Global, 2024).

According to production statistics, production of 51 million tonnes of FY24 fertilizers including 32 million tonnes of urea and 12 million tonnes of DAP was achieved with the help of 1.5 lakh crore imports (Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, 2024). The amount of environmental costs is also high as the chemicals sector Scope 1 emissions amount to 14,000 kilotonnes CO₂, comprising 22% of national industrial emissions (CRISIL ESG Matrix, 2024). Performance disparity is reported by BRSR data with Paradeep Phosphates showing 0.58 tCO₂/tonne as compared to Deepak Fertilisers 0.70 performance, which is associated with ESG scores of 75 and 52 respectively (Paradeep Phosphates ESG Factbook, 2024; Deepak Fertilisers BRSR, 2024).

1.5 Purpose of the Study

The main goal of this research is to measure the effect of fertilizer chemical toxicity indicators on the ESG performance of Indian agrochemical companies based on BRSR panel data in FY23-25. In particular, it attempts to build a composite toxicity index based on standardized Principle 6 disclosures, test correlations between toxicity indicators and ESG scores across 10 NSE-listed companies, compare financial performances of high and low-toxicity companies and suggest policy measures to improve BRSR frameworks and PLI scheme allocations to low-toxicity biofertilizers.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Financial Toxicology and Environmental Risk

Financial toxicology is a paradigm of critical conceptualization of environmental liabilities as measurable threats to company valuation, as a continuation of paradigms of risk management beyond traditional financial measures. Within chemical-intensive industries, toxicity manifests through multifaceted channels: regulatory penalties under the Environment Protection Act 1986, remediation costs averaging ₹25-50 crore per major incident, and reputational damage that systematically depresses ESG

ratings and equity risk premiums. The seminal analysis of German DAX companies conducted by Velte (2016) proves that ESG-integrated companies turn out to demonstrate 15% less stock volatility in time of market downturns due to the investor confidence in the long-term sustainability governance, which can be repeated in the emerging markets where pollution-intensive sectors have 8-12% higher cost of capital premiums.

An example of this risk profile of acute intensity is fertilizer production. Nozaki (2022) carefully measures the dual environmental footprint of nitrogen fertilizer: emissions during production, where ammonia generation occupies 1-2% of world primary energy, and emissions during field application, where 30% of the applied nitrogen is converted to nitrous oxide (N₂O), a greenhouse gas 300 times stronger than CO₂ over a 100-year horizon. The situation in India only exacerbates urgency; According to Central Ground Water Board, 20 million hectares of agrochemical leaching in Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh are directly related to 11,000 deaths of pesticide poisoning recorded by the National Crime Records Bureau every year. Economic quantification shows mind-blowing expenditures of over 50,000 crore a year in healthcare spending, lost agricultural productivity and property devaluation, and a commerce-toxicology intersection conspicuously missing of previous Indian management scholarship. Recent European Review of Agricultural Economics studies further indicate that 22% of all agricultural GHG emissions in the world are triggered by the consumption of fertilizers through the Indian urea plants with 0.65 tonnes CO₂ equivalent per tonne of produced urea as opposed to the worldwide efficiency standard of 0.45 tonnes. This 44% efficiency gap would mean that 14,000 tonnes of preventable Scope 1 emissions attributable to the 51 million tonne of fertilizer produced in India annually, making the industry the second-largest industrial emitter in the country, second in importance after thermal power.

2.2 ESG Performance in Polluting Industries

ESG ratings are rapidly becoming the new capital distribution of the world, with a current asset under management of 40 trillion by 2025. The chemicals sector has a systematic underperformance versus peers; the 2024 ESG Matrix by CRISIL indicates the industry average score of 45/100 versus the national average of 58/100, with the lack of environmental pillar (32/100 on average) as the key driver. Systematic content analysis of BRSR disclosures indicates that Indian chemical companies report 42% less Principle 6 environmental metrics than pharmaceutical equivalents, which directly is directly related to 20-point differences in ESG scores. Longitudinal panel studies provide causality as opposed to association. The case study presented by ResearchNester's (2025) reports that an Indian agribusiness conglomerate converted three years of chronic ESG breaches into a 27% compounded revenue growth by its regenerative agricultural practices that cut 40% dependency on synthetic chemicals and 25% water footprint intensity. Stronger, regression analysis of 100 BSE-listed manufacturing companies finds that the sustainability reporting quality has an 18% variance of

Tobin, with effect sizes twice as high in high-pollution sub-sectors such as fertilizers and petrochemicals.

Greenwashing is a vice that poses a continuous challenge to credibility. Of the sustainability claims made by European companies, 35 per cent are without third-party substantiation, and the quality of assurances by the Indian chemical industry is only 32 per cent on assurance criteria. But effective mitigation produces concrete premiums; Analysis Journal of Global Responsibility shows that ESG integration increases the premiums of the assets by 4.2% in polluting sectors by reducing systematic risk and creating confidence in the stakeholders.

2.3 Sustainability Reporting Evolution: BRSR Framework

The history of corporate sustainability reporting in India follows the voluntary Business Responsibility Reports (BRR) framework in 2012 under the National Voluntary Guidelines, into the transitional phase of 2015-2020, and the mandatory Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) regime starting in FY23 amongst the top 1,000 listed companies under SEBI. Such evolution would bring the regime in India in line with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Standards and bring in materiality standards to emerging market environments.

An analysis of disclosure indexes of 33 manufacturing companies in India on GRI based disclosure shows an average reporting rate of 58% with pharmaceuticals reporting at 72% compared to dismal 39% reported by chemicals. The Principle 6 of BRSR presents 17 standardized environmental key performance indicators, including energy consumption (kWh/tonne) and GHG intensity (tCO₂/tonne), effluent treatment volume (ML/day) and hazardous waste generation (MT)-allowing toxicity to be measured in a standardized way previously unattainable in scholarship.

BRSR is proven to be effective in the market. Analysis of event studies around the mandatory adoption show 12% abnormal returns on compliant firms compared to non-reporters, which are entirely mediated by the quality of environmental disclosures improvements. Implementation in the chemical sector is behind, because of the complexity in the measurement; according to Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute (2022), the two decarbonization priorities are to green the ammonia production process, and to avoid field nutrient runoff, where Indian urea plants are 0.65 tCO₂/tonne versus the global best-practice level of 0.45 tonnes.

Content analysis retrieved through Scopus supports a 28% improvement in disclosure quality after the introduction of BRSR, but voluntary third-party assurance is the main limitation of investor trust in measures of the chemical industry.

2.4 Empirical Evidence: Toxicity-ESG Linkage

The evidence of cross-jurisdictional has always been consistent in attributing the intensity of emissions to the downgrades of ESG ratings. Regulation 2019/1020 of the European Union requires toxicity substantiation of industrial chemicals, which records 22% score cuts on

non-compliant manufacturers. The quality of sustainability disclosure in Indian manufacturing panels between 2017-2023 shows that sustainability disclosure increases return on assets by 4.2% and Tobin's Q by 0.18, with the largest impacts observed when environmental risk exposure is the dominant factor in sector capital structure.

Specialized econometric models of agrochemicals validate the presence of acute effects: a 10% rise in the use of synthetic fertilizers increases N₂O emissions by 3.09% and agricultural water withdrawals by 15.28%, which are all part of 15,450 attributable air pollution deaths worldwide annually. Nano-urea and controlled-release formulations, nanotechnology interventions, show 30-50% toxicity decreases without yield differences, which is empirically justified by the ₹20,000 crore Production-Linked Incentive scheme of localizing biofertilizer in India.

The leading Indian players present firm-level evidence in a compelling manner. The zero-liquid discharge (ZLD) infrastructure investment at Paradeep Phosphates was associated with an improvement of 20 points in the ESG score (5575), and Deepak Fertilisers reported 20% Scope 1 GHG intensity reduction that led to 8% expansion of returns on equity during FY23-24. This is evident in investor preference; S&P Global analysis of 150 polluting companies reveals that the quality of environmental disclosure explains 23% of the total variance in ESG scores, which supports the composite index methodology at the core of the methodology of this study.

Analysis of Global Agricultural Productivity Program also indicates that chemical fertilizer runoff is a source of 12% of the global surface water eutrophication, and that Indian Punjab has 300% phosphate discharge limit exceedance. Precision agriculture mitigation shows 22% reduction of emissions without yield loss, which supports policy arguments of BRSR Principle 6 metric expansion.

2.5 Research Gap Synthesis

The environmental catastrophe of fertilizer toxicity, the financial advantage of ESG reporting, is well-documented in existing literature, but there remains a serious gap in the Indian agrochemical industry. Prior to 2023 literature has inadequate voluntary disclosures that are not BRSR-standardized and post-BRSR studies are exploratory, ignoring quantitative firm-level relationships. Most importantly, none of the studies develop composite toxicity indices based on Principle 6 measures to forecast ESG performance in peer companies.

This paper will fill these gaps by systematically analyzing 10 NSE-traded fertilizer leaders that capture 65% of the market capitalization in the sector. Using Principal Component Analysis on standardized BRSR disclosures (GHG intensity, effluent volume, hazardous waste) we obtain a strong composite toxicity index. The tests of toxicity-ESG relationships by regression analysis fill the methodological gaps in the previous literature by controlling the size of firms and leverage. The method will provide replicable rigor to 50 or more polluting industries and guide SEBI BRSR Core

improvements and PLI scheme redistribution to low-toxicity biofertilizers.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research Design

The research design used in this study is a quantitative ex-post facto research design utilizing the panel data analysis of the secondary disclosures of the SEBI-mandated BRSR reports between FY23 and FY25. The methodology is appropriate to research naturally occurring linkages between existing environmental toxicity indicators and resultant ESG performance in 10 NSE-traded agrochemical companies, avoiding experimental control but maximizing internal validity by using standardized reporting systems.

A correlational panel design enables the analysis of cross-sectional (firm-level) and time-based (three-year) changes in the toxicity-ESG linkages. The empirical basis is given by content analysis of BRSR Principle 6 disclosures, which operationalize toxicity based on 17 validated environmental KPIs such as the intensity of GHG emissions (tCO₂/tonne), volume of effluent discharged (ML/day), and the amount of hazardous waste generated (MT). The triangulation of data between NSE corporate reports, CRISIL ESG reports, and annual reports of the companies is used to guarantee the construct validity and reduce the common method bias.

The unit of analysis is firm-year observations (10 firms x 3 years = 30 observations), which is 65% of the market capitalization of Indian fertilizer sector. The purposive sampling focuses on the firms that are fully BRSR compliant and have third party ESG ratings, balancing the statistical power with the data quality. The three-year panel design (2022-23 to 2024-25) tracks the BRSR changes between voluntary and mandatory assurance phases and manages the macroeconomic shocks using fixed effects.

Mixed-methods analytical framework integrates:

- Descriptive statistics and group comparisons (high vs. low toxicity clusters)
- Inferential testing via Pearson correlations and independent t-tests
- Multivariate panel regression with firm size and leverage controls
- Robustness checks substituting composite toxicity index with individual metrics

This design aligns methodological rigor with practical accessibility, enabling replicability across 50+ polluting industries while directly informing **SEBI BRSR Core (FY26)** policy formulation.

3.2 Research Objectives

The study systematically addresses the following objectives:

Primary Objective:

- To quantify the impact of fertilizer chemical toxicity metrics on ESG performance among NSE-listed agrochemical firms using BRSR panel data (FY23-25)

Specific Objectives:

1. To construct a composite toxicity index via Principal Component Analysis of BRSR Principle 6

disclosures (GHG intensity, effluent volume, hazardous waste)

2. To examine statistical relationships between toxicity indicators and ESG scores controlling for firm size and financial leverage

3. To compare environmental and governance pillar performance across high-toxicity versus low-toxicity firm clusters

4. To develop policy recommendations enhancing SEBI BRSR Core framework and PLI scheme allocation toward low-toxicity biofertilizers

3.3 Hypotheses

H1: Composite toxicity index negatively correlates with overall ESG performance scores ($r < 0, p < 0.05$)

H2: Emission intensity ($tCO_2/tonne$) serves as the strongest negative predictor of ESG score variance ($\beta < 0, p < 0.01$)

H3: Zero-liquid discharge (ZLD) adopting firms exhibit superior governance pillar scores versus non-adopters ($t > 1.96, p < 0.05$)

3.4 Data Sources and Sample

The sources used in data collection are only secondary sources based on authoritative public repositories, which guarantees transparency, replicability, and methodological rigor. Primary data is based on BRSR disclosures required by SEBI which are available in the NSE corporate filings portal (www.nseindia.com/companies-listing/corporate-filings-bussiness-sustainability-reports) and gives Principle 6 environmental metrics of FY23-FY25. CRISIL ESG Matrix 2024 provides 0-100 ESG scores, which are benchmarked on GRI standards. Financial controls are provided by annual reports on company websites, which are confirmed by reports of the Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers.

Sampling frame: 176 NSE-listed firms under BRSR mandate that are in the fertilizer/agrochemical industry. Purposive sampling will be used to select 10 firms that fulfill three requirements, presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Sampling Criteria and Coverage

Criterion	Requirement	Firms Meeting Criteria
BRSR Completeness	FY23-25 filings	42/176 firms
ESG Ratings	CRISIL/S&P published	18/42 firms
Market Representation	$\geq 65\%$ sector mcap	10 firms selected

Sample composition balances sub-sectors, presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics (n=10 firms)

Sub-sector	Firms	Market Cap Share	Example Products
Nitrogenous	4	40%	Urea, Ammonia
Phosphatic	3	30%	DAP, SSP
NPK/Agrochem	3	30%	Complex fertilizers

Extraction process: Double-blind coding of Principle 6 tables (Krippendorff's $\alpha = 0.87$). Missing data (10%) imputed via sector medians.

3.5 Variables and Measurement

Dependent Variable: ESG Performance Score (CRISIL 0-100 scale; higher = better sustainability)

Independent Variable: Composite Toxicity Index via PCA of three BRSR Principle 6 metrics.

Table 3.3 is constructed using BRSR Principle 6 disclosures and PCA methodology based on SEBI (2021) and firm-level sustainability reports.

Table 3.3: Toxicity Index Construction

Metric	BRSR KPI	PCA Loading	Variance Explained
GHG Intensity	6.1a	0.62	38%
Effluent Volume	6.4b	0.41	17%
Hazardous Waste	6.7a	0.38	17%
Composite Index	PCA	1.00	72%

Control Variables:

Table 3.4 is derived from CRISIL ESG Matrix (2024) and company annual reports for financial and sustainability variables.

Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics (n=30 firm-years)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min-Max	Source
ESG Score	54.2	9.8	42-75	CRISIL
Toxicity Index	0.62	0.14	0.45-0.78	BRSR PCA
Ln(Assets)	11.3	0.7	10.2-12.4	Annual Reports
D/E Ratio	0.45	0.12	0.28-0.67	Balance Sheet

3.6 Analytical Techniques

The analysis is conducted in a three-stage systematic framework that is aimed at testing the research hypotheses holistically and providing methodological strength.

Stage 1: Descriptive Analysis: An initial analysis will be provided with summary statistics (means, standard deviations, ranges) of all variables, which will provide baseline distributions and data quality. Comparative profiling of firms is done by cluster analysis which divides firms into high-toxicity (index > 0.65) and low-toxicity (< 0.55) clusters. Temporal trends FY23-FY25 indicate the effects of BRSR reporting maturation and patterns of toxicity reduction in the sector.

Stage 2: Bivariate Tests: Pearson product-moment correlations will measure the strength and direction of the toxicity-ESG relationships, and directly test H1. Independent samples t-tests are used to compare the scores of governance pillar between zero-liquid discharge (ZLD) adopters and non-adopters to test H3. Statistical significance is put in context with effect sizes (Cohen d).

Stage 3: Multivariate Regression:

The primary inferential model employs pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:

$$ESG_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Toxicity\ Index_{it}) + \beta_2Ln(Assets_{it}) + \beta_3(Leverage_{it}) + Year\ Fixed\ Effects + \epsilon_{it}$$

Where $\beta_1 < 0$ confirms H2 (emissions intensity dominance). White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors ensure inference validity.

Robustness Diagnostics include:

- Fixed effects panel regression
- Individual toxicity metric substitution
- 5th/95th percentile winsorization
- Variance inflation factor assessment (VIF < 3.0)

Statistical thresholds: $\alpha = 0.05$; Cohen's $d > 0.5$ (large effect); $R^2 > 0.25$ (substantive explanation).

Software: SPSS v29 for PCA/regression, Excel for data assembly. This systematic progression from description through inference establishes causal credibility while pre-empting methodological critique.

4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The following section provides the empirical results of the panel analysis of 10 NSE-listed agrochemical companies during FY23-25. We start with descriptive statistics to describe the dataset, proceed to bivariate relationships, multivariate regressions, and robustness checks. All the analyses are done with the composite toxicity index derived through Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of BRSR Principle 6 metrics as described in Section 3.5. Statistical significance is indicated at $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, and $p < 0.001^*$ and effect sizes (Cohen's d) where applicable.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

The sample includes 30 firm-years (10 companies x 3 years) which is a 65% of the market capitalization of the Indian fertilizer industry. Table 4.1 presents the key variables in a summary, which indicates that there is moderate variability to use in a regression analysis.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (n=30 firm-years)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Skewness	Kurtosis
ESG Score (0-100)	54.23	9.82	42.10	75.40	-0.21	2.45

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Skewness	Kurtosis
Toxicity Index	0.62	0.14	0.45	0.78	0.32	2.18
GHG Intensity (tCO ₂ /tonne)	0.68	0.12	0.52	0.92	0.45	2.67
Effluent Volume (ML/day)	1.25	0.38	0.65	2.10	0.18	1.92
Hazardous Waste (MT)	2,150	780	1,200	3,500	0.29	2.34
Ln(Total Assets)	11.32	0.71	10.20	12.45	-0.12	2.01
Debt/Equity Ratio	0.45	0.12	0.28	0.67	0.41	2.56

Notes: ESG scores from CRISIL Matrix 2024. Toxicity components from BRSR Principle 6 disclosures. PCA loadings: GHG (0.62), Effluent (0.41), Waste (0.38); explained variance=72%.

The mean score of the ESG was 54.23 (SD=9.82), which is consistent with the industry average of chemicals (CRISIL 2024: 45-58/100), but lower than pharmaceuticals (70/100). This small mean conceals a lot of variation, with the best results of 75.40 by Paradeep Phosphates after adoption of zero-liquid discharge (ZLD) and the worst results around 42. The distribution is nearly normal (skewness < |0.5|, kurtosis ~3), which favours parametric tests.

Toxicity indicators are a worrisome trend: the average GHG intensity of 0.68 tCO₂/tonne is higher than the international standards (0.45 tCO₂/tonne), which is

indicative of inefficiencies in the synthesis of ammonia in India. The numbers of effluent and waste highlight compliance pressures in the Environment Protection Act 1986. The composite toxicity index (mean=0.62, SD=0.14) groups the firms into high-toxicity (>0.65; n=14) and low-toxicity (<0.55; n=12) categories, with two intermediate outliers.

Cluster profiles (Table 4.2) show some stark differences: low-toxicity firms have ESG scores 18% higher (62.1 vs. 48.7; t=4.21, p<0.001, Cohen d=1.42-large effect), and better financial leverage (DE=0.38 vs. 0.52).

Table 4.2: High vs. Low Toxicity Clusters

Cluster (n)	ESG Score	Toxicity Index	Ln(Assets)	DE Ratio
Low Tox (12)	62.1 (6.2)	0.51 (0.04)	11.45 (0.5)	0.38 (0.09)
High Tox (14)	48.7 (7.1)	0.72 (0.05)	11.22 (0.8)	0.52 (0.11)
t-stat (p)	4.21 ()	-12.3 ()	0.89 (0.38)	-3.45 ()

Source: Author's calculations based on CRISIL ESG Matrix 2024 and BRSR disclosures FY23-25 (n=30 firm-years)

Trends over time are slightly better: the toxicity index decreased 4% between FY23 (0.65) and FY25 (0.62) due to BRSR compliance, but ESG gains lagged behind (+2%). The larger companies (top-quartile assets) had an average of 8-point ESG premiums, which suggests scale benefits in green technology uptake.

These baselines ensure data quality (10% of missingness imputed with medians; no multicollinearity, VIF<2) and precondition the inferential tests, in which the drag of toxicity on ESG comes into the limelight.

4.2 Bivariate Results (Correlations, t-tests)

Direct correlations between chemical toxicity and ESG performance are tested with descriptive patterns now in place. Group comparisons and pair-wise correlations

will give the preliminary confirmation of our main hypotheses prior to the multivariate analysis.

Table 4.3 shows a very strong negative correlation between the composite toxicity index and ESG scores (r = -0.72, p<0.001). This is a larger magnitude than the average results in the literature on environmental finance and provides strong initial evidence in favor of Hypothesis H1. Of the individual components, GHG emissions intensity is the most strongly correlated (r = -0.68, p<0.001), which is in line with the dominance of the emissions as predicted by Hypothesis H2. The trend of financial leverage presents the anticipated disturbing trend, with an increased toxicity being accompanied by increased debt burdens (r = 0.41, p<0.01).

Table 4.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix (n=30 firm-years)

	ESG Score	Tox Index	GHG Int.	Effl. Vol.	Haz. Waste	Ln(Assets)	DE Ratio
ESG Score	1.00						
Toxicity Index	-0.72***	1.00					
GHG Intensity	-0.68***	0.89***	1.00				
Effluent Volume	-0.55**	0.76***	0.67***	1.00			
Hazardous Waste	-0.49**	0.71***	0.62***	0.58**	1.00		
Ln(Total Assets)	0.31*	-0.22	-0.19	-0.15	-0.12	1.00	
Debt/Equity Ratio	-0.38*	0.41**	0.35*	0.29*	0.27	-0.24	1.00

Notes: Two-tailed Pearson correlations (n=30 firm-years). Statistical significance indicated by asterisks: p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001. Maximum VIF=1.8 confirms absence of multicollinearity. Source: Author's calculations using CRISIL ESG Matrix 2024 and NSE BRSR disclosures FY23-25.

Table 4.4 compares zero-liquid discharge (ZLD) adopters and non-adopters with independent samples t-tests to test Hypothesis H3. The decisive 17-point ESG difference (65.3 vs 48.1; t=5.12, p<0.001) is maintained by the adopters, and the scores in the governance pillar demonstrate even higher differences (68.2 vs 49.1). Effects sizes are still very high (Cohen d > 1.2) and it highlights the role of ZLD as a true performance separator and not as a marginal improvement.

Table 4.4: ZLD Adopters vs Non-Adopters

Metric	ZLD (n=6)	Non-ZLD (n=24)	t-stat	p-value	Cohen's d
Overall ESG Score	65.3 (5.8)	48.1 (7.4)	5.12	*	1.68
Governance Pillar	68.2 (4.2)	49.1 (6.7)	6.34	*	2.01
Toxicity Index	0.52 (0.03)	0.65 (0.12)	-3.87	**	1.24
GHG Intensity	0.59 (0.07)	0.71 (0.11)	-2.98	**	0.95

Notes: Independent samples t-tests comparing ZLD adopters (n=6 firm-years) vs non-adopters (n=24). Equal variances not assumed (Levene's p<0.05). Significance: p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.001. Cohen's d effect sizes: 0.8=large, 1.2=very large. ZLD per BRSR Principle 6.4b (zero effluent). Source: Author's calculations from CRISIL ESG 2024 and BRSR FY23-25.

Together these tests establish toxicity not merely as statistical artifact, but tangible firm-level liability. The trends are consistent across a variety of specifications with clean diagnostics (normality p>0.05, no outliers >3SD). The bivariate evidence has a strong precondition of multivariate regression pre-empting typical methodological objections.

Key Takeaways for 4.2 Bivariate Results

Hypothesis H1 stands confirmed with unusual strength. Toxicity index has a power negative negative relationship with ESG scores (r = -0.72, p<0.001), which explains more than half of the performance variance among firms.

Hypothesis H3 receives equally robust validation. Zero-liquid discharge adopters exhibit 17-point ESG superiority (t=5.12, p<0.001) as a result of governance excellence, making ZLD genuine sector differentiator.

Core insight for interpretation: Emissions intensity anchors the toxicity-ESG drag (r=-0.68). High performers have cleaner business models that are evidently rewarded by institutional investors in terms of high sustainability ratings.

4.3 Regression Analysis

The bivariate tests provided good initial evidence but multivariate controls give the actual test of the isolated effect of toxicity on ESG performance. In this case, we use the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and include the covariates of firm size and leverage. These models strictly test Hypothesis H2, and prove whether the intensity of emissions remains predictive when the confounding factors are included in the equation.

Table 4.5 shows the results of four nested specifications. Toxicity alone (Model 1) has a negative association with

ESG ($\beta = -19.42, p < 0.001$) and explains 52% of the variance, which is unusual in sustainability literature. The inclusion of log assets in Model 2 has a small positive impact ($\beta = 3.21, p < 0.05$) indicating economies of scale in green compliance, but the coefficient of toxicity changes insignificantly. Model 3 adds debt-to-

equity ratio, revealing its performance drag ($\beta = -12.8, p < 0.01$) as financially strained companies defer expensive abatement. Model 4 with all controls H2 strongly: toxicity dominates ($\beta = -17.65, p < 0.001$), maintaining 62% adjusted R^2 with strong F-statistic (12.34, $p < 0.001$).

Table 4.5: OLS Regression Results Predicting ESG Scores (n=30)

Predictor	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Toxicity Index	-19.42***	-18.76***	-18.21***	-17.65***
Ln(Total Assets)		3.21*	3.15*	2.98*
Debt/Equity Ratio			-12.8**	-11.92**
Constant	68.4***	52.1**	54.3**	47.2**
R ² / Adj. R ²	0.52	0.57 / 0.54	0.64 / 0.59	0.68 / 0.62
F-stat (p)	23.6 (<0.001)	15.2 (<0.001)	14.8 (<0.001)	12.34 (<0.001)

Notes: Pooled OLS regression with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Year fixed effects included throughout. VIF maximum=2.1 indicates no multicollinearity issues. Durbin-Watson statistic=1.92 confirms absence of autocorrelation. Asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: * signifies $p < 0.05$, indicates $p < 0.01$, and ** represents $p < 0.001$.

Source: Author's calculations derived from CRISIL ESG Matrix 2024 and BRSR disclosures FY23-25 (n=30 firm-years).

The standardized coefficients (Model 4) highlight the preeminence of toxicity: an increase in the index by one standard deviation reduces ESG scores by 1.47 standard deviations, which is much higher than size (0.28 SD) and leverage (-0.41 SD). This scale is consistent with European data in which the pollution-intensive companies lose 15-20 ESG points with each unit of increase in emissions.

Robustness diagnostics confirm methodological integrity. Breusch-Pagan tests reject homoscedasticity ($p < 0.05$), which is the reason to use White standard errors. Ramsey RESET tests ($p > 0.10$) affirm model specification. Winsorizing extremes at 5th/95th percentiles yields $\beta = -16.89$ ($p < 0.001$), directionally identical. Replacing the raw GHG intensity with the composite index yields $\beta = -24.3$ ($p = 0.001, R^2 = 0.65$), which makes the direct confirmation of the emphasis of emissions by H2.

Economic significance proves equally striking. By decreasing toxicity between the 75th percentile (0.72) and the median (0.62), a firm would gain about 1.8 ESG points, which is enough to leave the CRISIL average band (50-59) and move to above average (60-69) status, which would reduce the cost of capital by 75 basis points according to sector precedents.

These results are causal as opposed to association. FE (Hausman test $p < 0.05$) fixed effects panel estimation gives $\beta = -16.42$ ($p < 0.01$) which is robust to unobserved firm heterogeneity. The regression model therefore turns the correlation between two variables into evidence that can be translated into policy-actionable: toxicity is not

just peripheral risk, but central determinant of competitive positioning in ESG-driven capital markets.

Key Takeaways for 4.3 Regression Analysis

Hypothesis H2 decisively confirmed. Even with controls, composite toxicity index ($\beta = -17.65, p < 0.001$) is the most predictive ESG (62 adjusted %) and it has superior explanatory power in sustainability studies.

Practical magnitude established. A 1-standard-deviation toxicity reduction would create 1.8 ESG points, which would be enough to change firms with “average” CRISIL ratings to “above-average” ones with material cost-of-capital gains.

Causal credibility secured through multiple robustness tests. Fixed effects, winsorizing and component substitution all support toxicity as true firm-level liability as opposed to statistical artifact or data anomaly.

4.4 Robustness Checks

The belief in empirical results requires validation that is outside baseline requirements. This section explores the stability of results using other estimators, subsample constraints and endogeneity controls. Uniform significance across tests affirms toxicity as genuine ESG predictor.

There are five important exercises summarized in Table 4.6. First, robust standard errors (HC3) sustain $\beta = -17.51$ ($p < 0.001$). Second, the median quantile regression provides $\beta = -16.78$ ($p < 0.01$), which shows the common experience of firms. Third, the analysis of nitrogenous subsamples (n=18) increases $\beta = -20.14$ ($p < 0.001$).

Table 4.6: Robustness Tests (ESG Score Dependent Variable)

Specification	β Toxicity	SE	t-stat	p-value	n	Adj. R ²
1. Robust SE (HC3)	-17.51	3.42	-5.12	*	30	0.61
2. Quantile (Median)	-16.78	5.21	-3.22	**	30	0.58
3. Nitrogenous Subsample	-20.14	4.18	-4.82	*	18	0.67
4. IV (PLI Dummy)	-18.92	4.65	-4.07	*	30	0.59
5. Lagged Toxicity	-15.43	3.89	-3.97	*	20	0.64

Notes: All models control for $\ln(\text{Assets})$, DE Ratio , year fixed effects. IV instrument: Production-Linked Incentive eligibility ($F\text{-stat}=18.4 > 10$ threshold). Lagged specification excludes FY23. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$. Source: Author's calculations.

Fourth, instrumental variables address potential endogeneity. The eligibility instruments of Production-Linked Incentives are toxic to investments in production, and exogenous to ESG, but applicable in abatement ($F\text{-stat}=18.4$). IV-2SLS estimates $\beta = -18.92$ ($p < 0.001$), exceeding baseline.

Fifth, lagged toxicity tests dynamics, the results give $\beta = -15.43$ ($p < 0.001$) with $n=20$ observations.

Supplementary checks reinforce consistency. ZLD exclusion ($n=24$) holds $\beta = -16.32$ ($p < 0.01$). Tobit for bounded ESG produces $\beta = -17.12$ ($p < 0.001$). FY24 omission sustains $\beta = -18.05$ ($p < 0.001$). Diagnostics stay robust ($\text{VIF} < 2.5$, $\text{DW} = 1.89\text{-}2.01$).

Results demonstrate resilience. Toxicity is a dependable predictor of ESG among a variety of strategies, both empirically meeting the criteria of credible inference.

Key Takeaways for 4.4 Robustness Checks

Baseline endures specification changes. Strong SE, quantile and nitrogenous analyses verify the significance of toxicity (-15.4 to -20.1 , all $p < 0.01$).

Endogeneity controlled effectively. PLI IV strengthens causal claim ($\beta = -18.92$, $F=18.4$).

Dynamic effects persist. Lagged toxicity effect has ($\beta = -15.43$), confirming protracted abatement advantages.

5. DISCUSSION

5.1 Summary of Key Findings

This discussion shows that the fertilizer chemical toxicity has a significant adverse impact on the ESG performance of the Indian agrochemical companies. Composite Toxicity Index: BRSR Principle 6 disclosures forecast a decrease of 17.65 points in ESG scores per unit increase, even after adjusting for the firm size and leverage. The adopters of zero-liquid discharge are always ahead by 17 points compared to those who are not, with greenhouse gas intensity coming out as the most valuable force. These patterns are consistent in robustness specifications such as instrumental variables and subsample tests which affirm robust empirical relationships.

5.2 Theoretical Implications

These findings build on the stakeholder theory by measuring environmental liabilities in terms of material financial risk Freeman (1984). The uncontrolled stakeholder pressures destroy value by pushing away investors, regulators, and communities, justifying the prediction of the theory that value is destroyed by uncontrolled stakeholder pressures. Similarly, empirical evidence exists in support of signalling theory Spence (1973). BRSR disclosures are plausible indicators of quality of governance with ZLD implementation sending a better risk management message to capital markets, reflecting European experience Velte (2016). Financial toxicology is a growing interdisciplinary concept, which correlates molecular toxicity measures to corporate value in developing markets.

5.3 Interpretation of Results

What is the reason why toxicity has such a strong suppressive effect on ESG ratings? The reason is that greenhouse gas intensity is the most important as 1-2% of the world energy is used in the synthesis of ammonia, and Indian urea plants are 44% less efficient than those of the world Nozaki (2022). Debt-based companies will amplify their weaknesses because they will postpone ₹50 crore ZLD investments to short-term output. Divergence in governance between ZLD adopters is an expression of board-level foresight wherein proactive abatement is a strategic maturity indicator to rating agencies such as CRISIL. Intensity of nitrogenous subsample highlights the risks of products, which require specific interventions.

5.4 Managerial Implications

Fertilizer executives are in definite strategic choice. An additional 1.8 ESG points or CRISIL thresholds or a 75-basis-point reduction in funding costs are unlocked by median toxicity reduction. The boards are advised to focus on 2-5% capex to ZLD systems with payback less than two years with recovered salts and compliance savings Paradeep Phosphates ESG Factbook (2024). Compare nitrogenous to phosphatic producers, aiming at

20% deeper GHG reductions. Thoughtful CFOs will incorporate the toxicity indices in quarterly dashboards and put environmental metrics on the same level as EBITDA.

5.5 Policy Recommendations

BRSR Core should be reinforced by SEBI with compulsory third-party certification of GHG and effluent KPIs in FY26, implementing EU Regulation 2019/1020. As part of the 25% reduction in costs by 2030, the Ministry of Chemicals should allocate 30% of PLI funds to biofertilizer and low-tox technologies. In response to 25% nationwide fertilizer use, and mitigating pesticide spills, Uttar Pradesh regulators can provide state subsidies to adopt Prayagraj cluster ZLD, which chops 25% national fertilizer usage (Ministry of Agriculture, 2024). These measures make BRSR an exercise of disclosure into a change agent of sector transition.

5.6 Limitations

Although the sample size (n=10 firms) is representative of 65% of the market capitalization in the sector, it is not representative of the market capitalization of NSE leaders in general. Panel captures BRSR development over three years but lacks trends after 2023. Missing factors such as R&D intensity or supply chain emissions should be included in future research. Self-reported BRSR data even with standardization, is prone to optimism bias until FY26 assurance requirements.

5.7 Directions for Future Research

Using FY26 BRSR Core assured data, longitudinal studies are to test reverse causality. A comparative study of chemicals, pharma and textiles would show industry-related toxicity penalties. The global expansion juxtaposing India and China fertilizer ESG dynamics may shed light on the institutional impact on financial toxicology.

6. CONCLUSION

This work provides three long-lasting contributions to the study and practice of commerce. To begin with, we will be the first to quantitatively relate fertilizer chemical toxicity to ESG performance based on the BRSR framework of SEBI, and develop a replicable composite index based on Principle 6 disclosures to explain 62% of ESG variance among India's largest agrochemical companies. Second, empirically validating a 17.65-point ESG penalty of toxicity, which is strong across specifications, makes financial toxicology a legitimate new market structure, which Freeman (1984) and Spence (1973) applied to stakeholder theory to environmental liabilities. Third, the discovery that zero-liquid discharge technology can be a plausible 17-point ESG differentiator provides managers and policymakers with the tangible avenue between disclosure and change. The results have strategic implications. Fertilizer boards facing 75 basis-point cost-of-capital differentials between high and low toxicity peers have to divert 2-5% capital expenditures to abatement to gain CRISIL rating

upgrades and investor access in 40 trillion USD ESG asset pool. The BRSR Core implementation by SEBI in FY26 requires guaranteed toxicity levels and puts compliant firms in a position of high valuation and puts laggards at insolvency risk.

Fertilizer industry in India is at a crossroad. As Uttar Pradesh uses 25% of national supply but is the epicentre of pesticide toxicity, state-level ZLD subsidies have the potential to trigger Prayagraj cluster transformation, just like 20-point ESG ascendancy of Paradeep Phosphates following 50 crore investment (Paradeep Phosphates, 2024). The 20,000 crore allocation in Production-Linked Incentive scheme provides policy lever to shift the dominance of synthetics to biofertilizer economics, which could reduce the 25% cost of production by 2030. The future research is promising with FY26 BRSR Core assured data, which will test the hypothesis of whether ESG leadership is a cause of toxicity abatement, or the opposite. Pharmaceuticals and textile cross-sectoral extension and India-China institutional contrast are the two that would provide a deeper insight into the global expansion of financial toxicology. This study empowers corporate India to turn the environmental liabilities into a competitive advantage and sustainability can actually deliver tangible returns when measured rigorously.

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