RESEARCH PAPER

An Analytical Examination of the Right to Life and the Claimed Right to Die

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Abstract

For decades, the right to life has stood as the supreme guarantee in legal systems around the world. It is the first right listed in the constitutions and human rights treaties. But what does the right to life truly mean when a person finds their own existence unbearable? This paper moves away from rigid legal formulas and instead asks a more human question: Does respecting a person's life also mean respecting their wish to end it? Through a comparative and analytical lens, this study separates the right to die into three distinct ideas: refusing treatment, assisted dying, and direct euthanasia. It argues that while the state has a duty to protect life, a modern interpretation of dignity requires us to see the right to life not as a command to stay alive at any cost, but as a shield that includes the freedom to leave life on one's own terms, especially in the face of irreversible suffering. The paper further examines landmark judicial decisions across India, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands, tracing the gradual evolution of constitutional jurisprudence on this issue. Drawing from philosophical, ethical, and legal traditions, the paper concludes by proposing a comprehensive middle path: a legal framework that prioritises consent, safeguards, and compassion over blanket prohibitions.

Keywords: Right to Life, Right to Die, Human Dignity, Palliative Care, Advance Directives, Judicial Activism, Comparative Law, Bioethics

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1. Introduction

Imagine a patient lying in a hospital bed. Machines beep around them. Their body is failing, their mind is sharp, but their pain is constant and incurable. They ask their doctor for help to die peacefully. The doctor refuses, citing the law's command to protect life. The patient lives, but is that living? Or is it merely existing? This is the central puzzle of this research. The right to life is traditionally understood as a negative right: the state cannot arbitrarily take your life. But over time, courts and philosophers have expanded it to include positive duties; the state must provide food, water, and medical care to keep you alive. However, a newer, more uncomfortable question has emerged: If life is a right, can it also be a burden? And if so, does the same legal framework that protects life also give a person the authority to let go of it?

The phrase 'right to die' is not found in any major constitution. It is a shadow right that courts have either implicitly recognised or outright rejected. This paper does not take an extreme position. It does not argue that anyone who feels sad or lonely should be allowed to end their life. Instead, it draws a careful line, examining the right to die only in situations of terminal illness, unbearable suffering, and unimpaired mental capacity. The goal is to see whether a humane reading of the right to life actually supports, rather than contradicts, a limited right to die.

The significance of this inquiry cannot be overstated. As populations age, as medical technology becomes more capable of extending biological life without restoring its quality, and as patients become more informed and assertive about their healthcare decisions, legal systems around the world are being forced to confront a question that their founders never anticipated: What happens when protecting life causes suffering? This study is analytical and comparative, not political. It examines how different legal families, common law (India, UK, US) and civil law (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany) have approached this tension. It looks at landmark judgments, constitutional provisions, and ethical frameworks. The argument is structured in accessible

language because the subject matter concerns every human being, not just lawyers or legislators.

2. Unpacking the Right to Life: More Than Just Breathing

Before we talk about dying, we must understand what living means in the eyes of the law. The right to life appears in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and in the foundational structure of most national constitutions. For example, Article 21 of the Indian Constitution declares: 'No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.' Similarly, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution protect life from state deprivation without due process.

For most of legal history, this right was understood narrowly. It protected individuals from being killed by the government. That was all. But in the latter half of the twentieth century, courts began to expand its meaning. In India, the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) read Article 21 to include the right to live with dignity. In Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), the same court recognized that dignity includes the right to refuse medical treatment and to have a living will. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights in Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002) accepted that the right to life does not create an absolute duty to live, though it refused to find a positive right to die.

Three Components of the Right to Life

- Negative Component: The state cannot arbitrarily take your life. This is the foundational guarantee against state-sponsored killing, arbitrary detention, and execution without due process.
- Positive Component: The state must take affirmative steps to prevent premature death through healthcare infrastructure, sanitation, emergency services, and social welfare systems.
- Dignity Component: The state must ensure that your life is worth living. This includes freedom from torture, degrading treatment, and conditions that reduce a person's existence to bare biological survival without meaningful human experience.

What emerges from these cases is a layered understanding that reshapes the entire debate. It is the third component, the dignity component, that creates the most profound tension with blanket prohibitions on assisted dying. If dignity is part of life, then forcing a person to endure a degrading, painful, or unconscious existence might actually violate their right to life rather than uphold it. In other words, protecting life without protecting dignity turns the right into a punishment.

This is not a radical proposition. In many countries, courts have allowed patients to refuse life-saving treatment, including nutrition and hydration delivered through medical tubes. They have recognised that a competent adult has the right to say 'no' to medical intervention even when that refusal leads to death. But saying 'no' to treatment is not the same as asking for help to die. The former is passive; the latter is active. The law has traditionally treated these two actions very differently. This paper questions whether that difference is logically or morally sustainable.

The philosophical roots of this tension run deep. Natural law theorists like Thomas Aquinas argued that life is a gift from God and must be preserved. Kantian ethics, by contrast, emphasises rational autonomy, the right of a competent person to make decisions about their own life and body, free from external coercion. Utilitarian theory asks: which outcome maximises overall well-being? In the context of irreversible suffering, the utilitarian calculus may favour a dignified death over prolonged agony. Contemporary bioethics, drawing on all three traditions, has arrived at a nuanced position: neither pure paternalism nor pure autonomy is sufficient. The law must balance both.

3. The Right to Die: A Cluster of Claims

The term 'right to die' is misleading because it groups together several distinct legal claims with very different moral and practical implications. To analyse the issue properly, we must carefully separate these claims and examine the legal treatment of each independently.

Table 1: Legal Dimensions of the Right to Die Across Jurisdictions

Category	Who Acts	Legal Status (Global)	Key Jurisdictions
Refusal of Treatment	Patient (passive)	Widely accepted	India, US, UK, EU
Assisted Suicide	Patient (with doctor's means)	Limited acceptance	Oregon, Switzerland, Canada
Voluntary Euthanasia	Doctor (at patient's request)	Narrow acceptance	Netherlands, Belgium, Spain
Non-Terminal Suffering	Doctor (broader criteria)	Most controversial	Netherlands, Belgium only

3.1 The Right to Refuse Treatment

This is the most widely accepted form of the right to die. A mentally sound adult can refuse any medical treatment, even if that refusal leads to death. Courts in the United States recognized this in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990), where the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to liberty encompasses a competent person's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. The United Kingdom followed in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993), where the House of Lords permitted withdrawal of artificial nutrition from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. India affirmed this right in Common Cause (2018). There is no legal duty to accept medicine. Your body is yours. This is not euthanasia; it is letting nature take its course.

3.2 The Right to Assisted Suicide (Physician-Assisted Dying)

Here, the person themselves administers the lethal substance, but a doctor provides the means, typically a prescription for a lethal dose of medication. This is legal in Switzerland (via organisations like Dignitas), Germany (in limited circumstances following a 2020 Federal Constitutional Court ruling), several US states (Oregon since 1997, Washington, California, Colorado, Vermont, and others), and Canada (under the Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) legislation since 2016). The person must be capable of self-administration. The law draws a line: the final act must be the patient's own, preserving their agency even in the act of dying.

3.3 The Right to Voluntary Active Euthanasia

In this category, a doctor directly administers a lethal agent at the patient's explicit request. This is legal in the Netherlands (since 2002), Belgium (since 2002, including for minors since 2014), Luxembourg (since 2009), Colombia (since a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling), Canada (since 2016 under MAID), and Spain (since 2021). The patient need not be physically able to administer anything. The law permits a third party to end the patient's life intentionally, but only with explicit, repeated, fully informed, and uncoerced consent. The moral and practical distinction between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia is largely one of who performs the final act, but both rest on the foundation of patient autonomy and unbearable suffering.

3.4 The Right to Die Beyond Terminal Illness

Some jurisdictions have expanded eligibility beyond terminal illness to include psychiatric suffering, severe disability, and even advanced age combined with a general tiredness of life ('completed life' in Dutch voltooid leven). The Netherlands and Belgium are the most expensive in this regard. Belgium allows euthanasia for mature minors with terminal illness and parental consent. These expansions are the most controversial globally and represent the frontier of the debate. This paper does not argue for or against such expansions; it focuses its primary analysis on terminal and irreversible physical suffering while acknowledging that broader interpretations exist and raise distinct ethical questions.

4. The Core Tension: Does Protecting Life Require Preventing Death?

The traditional objection to any right to die is grounded in the state's compelling interest in preserving life and protecting vulnerable populations. Four principal arguments are consistently advanced in legislatures, courts, and ethical debates around the world.

Sanctity of Life: Sanctity of Life: Life has intrinsic, inalienable value. Allowing intentional death, even at a patient's request, fundamentally undermines this principle and opens the door to treating human life as disposable.

Slippery Slope: Legalising assisted dying will inevitably lead to abuse, particularly of the elderly, persons with disabilities, and economically disadvantaged populations who may feel pressured to choose death.

Medical Ethics: Medical Ethics: Doctors are healers. Asking them to administer lethal substances violates the foundational Hippocratic tradition and will erode public trust in the medical profession.

Fallibility of Consent: Fallibility of Consent: A person asking to die may be clinically depressed, coerced by family, financially motivated, or otherwise incapable of making a truly free and informed decision about irreversible action.

These are serious concerns. No honest researcher can dismiss them as mere prejudice or religious sentimentalism. However, a closer analytical examination reveals that while they are compelling warnings, they do not constitute absolute walls. They define the contours of necessary safeguards, not the impossibility of reform.

Consider the sanctity argument. Many religious and philosophical traditions distinguish meaningfully between 'being alive' (having a heartbeat and measurable brain activity) and 'having a life' (experiencing meaningful human existence). Aquinas himself distinguished between killing and allowing natural death. When a person is in relentless, medically documented pain with no prospect of improvement, forcing continued biological existence is not honouring the sanctity of life; it is honouring the sanctity of suffering. The European Court of Human Rights in Lambert v. France (2015) accepted that withdrawing life support can be compatible with the right to life under the European Convention.

The slippery slope argument is empirical, not logically necessary. It requires actual evidence of abuse, not merely a theoretical possibility. Evidence from Oregon, where the Death with Dignity Act has operated since 1997, shows no widespread abuse of vulnerable populations. The Netherlands has seen euthanasia requests increase, but the percentage of total deaths by euthanasia has stabilised around four to five per cent annually, and the vast majority of requests are denied. Safeguards, mandatory waiting periods, independent psychiatric evaluation, second and third medical opinions, review committees, and demonstrably work. Regulatory regimes can be both permissive and protective.

Medical ethics evolve with medical practice. Doctors already withdraw life support, prescribe high-dose analgesics that may hasten death under the doctrine of double effect, and routinely respect patients' refusals of treatment. The distinction between 'allowing to die' and 'helping to die' is philosophically contested. A doctor who provides palliative sedation, reducing a patient to a permanent state of unconsciousness to relieve pain, is not meaningfully differentin intent or outcomefrom a doctor who administers a lethal agent at the patient's informed request. The Hippocratic tradition is not monolithic: the Royal Dutch Medical Association supports euthanasia; the British Medical Association has moved toward a neutral position; the American Medical Association opposes it. Medical ethics reflects cultural and legal context, not immutable natural law.

Finally, consent, the cornerstone of all medical ethics and contract law, can be verified and safeguarded. The law already manages consent in complex surgical procedures, clinical trials, and end-of-life care. Depression can be diagnosed and treated; if a patient recovers and still wishes to die, that is more compelling, not less. Family pressure can be assessed through independent interviews. Economic motive can be screened through mandatory consultations that specifically exclude financial considerations. Fallibility is the reason for rigorous procedure, not the justification for absolute prohibition.

5. Comparative Judicial Analysis: How Courts Have Navigated the Divide

Across legal systems, courts have approached the tension between the right to life and the right to die in ways that reflect their constitutional structures, cultural traditions, and institutional relationships with legislatures. A comparative examination reveals a global trend toward greater recognition of autonomy, even where active euthanasia remains legally prohibited.

5.1 India: From Absolute Prohibition to Limited Recognition

India's constitutional journey on this question is both instructive and still unfolding. For decades, Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (now converted into Section 226 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) criminalised attempted suicide. The right to life under Article 21 was interpreted as categorically excluding any right to die. In State v. Sanjay Kumar Bhatia (1985), the Delhi High

Court held that since death is the antithesis of life, the right to life could not logically encompass a right to die. This binary logic began to fracture in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996), where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 309 but crucially added that the right to life includes the right to live with dignity, planting a seed that would grow significantly. The complete transformation came in the landmark five-judge bench ruling in Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), which recognised the right to die with dignity as a fundamental component of Article 21. The court legalised advance medical directives (living wills), allowing persons to specify in advance that they refuse life-sustaining treatment if they become terminally ill and unable to communicate.

India now formally recognises passive euthanasia and advance directives, while prohibiting active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. This represents a carefully calibrated middle position, acknowledging autonomy while maintaining limits that reflect the court's assessment of Indian social conditions and institutional capacity. The Mental Healthcare Act of 2017 further decriminalised attempted suicide, recognising that suicidal behaviour is primarily a mental health issue requiring care rather than punishment.

5.2 United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Restraint

The United Kingdom presents a study in democratic restraint. In Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002), Diane Pretty, suffering from motor neurone disease and facing a degrading death, asked for an assurance that her husband would not be prosecuted for helping her die. Both the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights refused, holding that the right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention does not create a corresponding right to choose death, and that the prohibition on assisted suicide under the Suicide Act 1961 pursued a legitimate aim of protecting vulnerable persons.

Subsequent litigation, most notably R (Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Justice (2014), led the Supreme Court to openly invite Parliament to reconsider the blanket prohibition, finding it potentially incompatible with Convention rights but ultimately declining to issue a declaration of incompatibility. The court's position was essentially: we could intervene, but this is a question that democratic deliberation should answer first. Several private members' bills have been introduced since then, including the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill in 2024, which passed its second reading in the House of Commons, signalling that the parliamentary landscape may be shifting.

Currently, the UK allows refusal of treatment but prohibits assisted suicide and euthanasia. The Director of Public Prosecutions has issued guidance indicating that prosecution is unlikely when a person assists a family member to die in response to their clear, settled, autonomous decision, creating a de facto zone of tolerance without formal legal change. This arrangement is legally precarious and ethically unsatisfying, but it reflects the political difficulty of the issue.

5.3 The Netherlands: A Model of Regulated Compassion

The Netherlands legalized voluntary active euthanasia in 2002 under the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, following decades of case law and medical practice that had progressively expanded tolerance for euthanasia by physicians who could demonstrate adherence to strict criteria. The statutory requirements include: unbearable and hopeless suffering (not necessarily terminal), a voluntary and well-considered request maintained over time, the patient being fully informed of their condition and prognosis, no reasonable alternative treatment, consultation with at least one independent physician, and performance by a qualified medical practitioner with reporting to a Regional Euthanasia Review Committee.

Over two decades of data demonstrate that the Dutch system functions as designed. Approximately eighty percent of euthanasia cases involve cancer patients. Annual euthanasia deaths account for roughly four to five percent of total deaths. Regional review committees consistently find the vast majority of cases to be compliant with the law. Involuntary euthanasia, the central fear of critics, has not emerged as a documented systemic problem. Public support for the law remains consistently above seventy percent. The Dutch experience constitutes the most comprehensive real-world test of a right-to-die framework, and its results are sobering for both extreme abolitionists and extreme libertarians.

5.4 United States: A Patchwork of State Laws

The United States presents a federalist landscape where the right to die has been contested at both federal constitutional and state statutory levels. In Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), the Supreme Court held that the

Constitution does not protect a right to assisted suicide, but explicitly left states free to legislate on the matter. This has produced a patchwork: Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (1997) was the pioneer; as of 2024, ten states and the District of Columbia have enacted similar statutes. All require terminal illness with a prognosis of six months or less, mental competency, multiple oral and written requests, a waiting period, and physician confirmation.

Oregon's twenty-seven-year record is instructive. The number of persons who obtain prescriptions for lethal medications is small (fewer than 300 per year in recent years), and a substantial portion do not ultimately use them. Simply having the option provides psychological comfort and a sense of control. There have been no documented cases of coercion or abuse. The most common reasons cited by patients are not pain but loss of autonomy, decreasing ability to engage in enjoyable activities, and loss of dignity.

6. An Analytical Framework: Reconciling the Two Rights

After reviewing comparative case law, empirical data, and ethical arguments across jurisdictions, this paper proposes a structured legal framework that genuinely reconciles the right to life with a limited and carefully circumscribed right to die. This framework does not seek to maximise either the right to life or the right to autonomy in isolation. Rather, it seeks to honour both simultaneously by creating conditions under which each can be exercised without undermining the other.

Principle 1: Presumption in Favour of Life

The default legal position must always be to preserve life. No person should ever be offered death as an option; it must always be requested and initiated by the individual themselves. The right to die is an exception carved out from the right to life, not a parallel or equivalent right. This means that no system of assisted dying should be established in a way that normalises death as a solution to suffering. Palliative care, mental health support, disability accommodation, and social welfare must be developed simultaneously and prioritised. The right to die should be exercised only when the right to live well has been genuinely exhausted.

Principle 2: Rigorous Capacity and Voluntariness Assessment

The person must be fully mentally competent at the time of making and confirming the request. Competence means understanding the nature of their condition, the realistic prognosis, all available treatment alternatives, the irreversibility of the requested action, and the legal process involved. The request must be demonstrably free from external pressure, including financial, familial, or social pressure. A minimum waiting period of fifteen to thirty days should apply between the first formal request and any action, with at least two separate consultations during that period. Any indication of depression or treatable psychological distress must trigger psychiatric evaluation and treatment before the request can proceed. An independent patient advocate, not employed by the healthcare providers, should be appointed to assess all cases.

Principle 3: Threshold of Suffering

The suffering must be physical or psychological in nature, irreversible given current medical knowledge, documented by at least two independent physicians who are specialists in the relevant condition, and of a severity that a reasonable person in the patient's position would find unbearable. Terminal illness with a confirmed prognosis of six months or less provides a clear threshold but may be unnecessarily restrictive. Non-terminal but irreversible and documented unbearable sufferings, such as late-stage neurological disease, severe burns, or treatment-resistant chronic pain, should also qualify, subject to higher scrutiny and additional safeguards. A mere desire to avoid old age, a fear of being a burden, or economic hardship does not satisfy this threshold.

Principle 4: Medical Participation is Voluntary, Training is Mandatory

No physician, nurse, pharmacist, or other healthcare professional should be compelled to participate in assisted dying. Conscientious objection must be fully protected, with an obligation on the objecting provider to refer the patient to a willing colleague without delay. At the same time, physicians who choose to participate must receive specialised training in palliative care assessment, mental capacity evaluation, and the legal requirements of the assisted dying process. The state has an affirmative obligation to ensure that a sufficient number of willing physicians exist in every geographic area, so that access to assisted dying is not effectively denied through a shortage of providers.

Principle 5: Transparency, Accountability, and Review

Every case of assisted dying must be formally reported to an independent review committee within forty-eight hours of the procedure. The committee should include

medical professionals, legal experts, ethicists, and lay members. It should have the authority to refer cases to prosecutors where irregularities are found. Anonymised aggregate data should be published annually, including demographic breakdowns, diagnoses, reasons cited by patients, and any compliance concerns. Criminal penalties, including imprisonment, should apply to any healthcare provider who assists in a death without complying with all statutory requirements. This transparency is not merely bureaucratic: it is the mechanism by which public trust is built and maintained.



Figure 1: Framework Summary

7. Addressing Counterarguments with Intellectual Honesty

No analytical legal paper is complete without engaging seriously with the strongest opposing arguments. The following objections represent the most powerful critiques of any right-to-die framework and deserve careful, evidence-based responses.

Objection 1: Vulnerable Persons Will Be Pressured to Choose Death

This is perhaps the most serious practical objection. In societies with inadequate social safety nets, elderly or disabled persons may feel that they are a burden, financial, emotional, or practical, to their families and to public health systems. If assisted dying is available, might they feel pressure to choose it not out of genuine autonomous desire but out of a sense of social obligation? This risk is real and must be directly confronted, not dismissed.

The response must operate on two levels. First, within the legal framework itself, mandatory independent assessment specifically designed to screen for any form of economic or social pressure is non-negotiable. The patient must be interviewed alone by a trained assessor with no stake in the outcome. Any identified economic motive, whether the patient's own or a family member's, disqualifies the request at that time. Second, and more fundamentally, a right-to-die framework must be embedded within a comprehensive social support system. If society fails to provide adequate care for its disabled and elderly members, adequate pain management, home care, financial support, and social inclusion, then offering death as an option is morally indistinguishable from coercion. The right to die and the right to live well are not alternatives; they must coexist.

Objection 2: Legalizing Assisted Dying Normalizes Suicide

Critics argue that extending legal protection to assisted dying sends a social signal that some lives are not worth living, that death is an acceptable response to suffering. This, the argument goes, undermines public health efforts to prevent suicide among depressed, mentally ill, or socially isolated persons, particularly young people.

The distinction between clinical suicide prevention and assisted dying is both morally and empirically significant. The person experiencing suicidal ideation in the context of treatable depression is in a different category from a person who has lived fully, maintains intact cognitive function, and faces a terminal or irreversible physical condition from which medicine offers no relief. Assisted dying laws in every jurisdiction that permits them explicitly exclude persons whose sole basis for the request is mental illness (except in the Netherlands and Belgium, where strictly managed exceptions exist after years of treatment failure). The Oregon data show no increase in general suicide rates following the legalisation of the Death with Dignity Act. The two phenomena must be treated distinctly in both law and public communication.

Objection 3: Physicians Will Lose Public Trust

The healer-killer paradox: if the same person who treats you might also kill you, will patients withhold symptoms for fear of being deemed worthy of death rather than treatment? This concern has been raised by medical associations in multiple countries.

Available evidence from jurisdictions where assisted dying is legal does not support this fear. Public trust in the medical profession in the Netherlands and in Oregon has not measurably declined following legalisation. Patients in these jurisdictions report that knowing assisted dying is available actually increases their trust in their physicians because it demonstrates that the physician's commitment is to the patient's wellbeing, not to the maintenance of biological life at all costs.

Transparency is the key: a secret or informal euthanasia practice that existed in many countries before legalisation is far more damaging to trust than an open, regulated, and compassionate legal system.

Objection 4: Diagnostic Uncertainty Makes a Death Irreversible

Medicine is not infallible. Patients given prognoses of six months to live sometimes survive for years. Conditions deemed untreatable today may become treatable tomorrow. Is it not possible that a person who chooses assisted dying might have recovered or benefited from a new therapy?

This objection has real force and must not be dismissed. The framework proposed in this paper addresses it through mandatory second and third opinions, waiting periods, and a threshold of irreversibility assessed against current best medical knowledge rather than speculative future possibilities. No legal standard can require absolute certainty about the future. Courts already make life-altering decisions on the balance of probabilities. What the law can require is that the best available medical judgment, rendered by multiple qualified specialists, supports the conclusion that the suffering is irreversible. This does not eliminate the risk of diagnostic error; it reduces it to an acceptable level, comparable to the risk already accepted in withdrawing life support.

8. The International Human Rights Dimension

Beyond national constitutional frameworks, international human rights law provides an important lens through which to assess the right to die. The relevant instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 2006).

The Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the ICCPR, has held that the right to life under Article 6 requires states to take positive measures to preserve life but has not interpreted it as prohibiting voluntary assisted dying. The Committee against Torture has noted that forcing a person to endure extreme suffering without their consent may amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, a significant observation when applied to the medical prolongation of suffering without therapeutic benefit.

The CRPD presents a more complex analysis. Its Article 10 affirms the inherent right to life, while its broader framework prohibits denial of reasonable accommodation and requires equal enjoyment of all rights by persons with disabilities. Some disability rights advocates argue that assisted dying laws implicitly devalue disabled lives by suggesting that they are less worth living. Others within the disability community argue that autonomy, including the autonomous choice of a disabled person to seek assisted dying, must be equally respected. The CRPD framework does not clearly resolve this tension, and the debate within the disability community itself is ongoing and multifaceted.

The European Court of Human Rights has moved incrementally. In Haas v. Switzerland (2011), it recognised that the right to self-determination under Article 8 (private life) may encompass the right to decide how and when to end one's life, while affirming that states have a margin of appreciation in regulating the conditions under which assisted dying may occur. In Gross v. Switzerland (2014), the Court found a violation where Swiss law failed to provide clear guidance on access to lethal medication. These rulings do not mandate the legalisation of assisted dying across all member states, but they firmly establish that blanket prohibitions without any consideration of individual circumstances may be incompatible with Convention rights.

9. The Indispensable Role of Palliative Care

Any serious discussion of the right to die must engage with the profound importance of palliative care, the specialised medical field focused on relief of pain, symptoms, and the stress of serious illness. Many bioethicists and physicians argue that the demand for assisted dying is, in significant part, a symptom of palliative care failure. When pain is adequately managed, when patients have access to psychological support, and when they are not abandoned to die alone, requests for assisted dying diminish substantially.

The World Health Organization estimates that approximately forty million people require palliative care annually, but fewer than fourteen percent receive it. In low- and middle-income countries, the gap is even more severe. India, despite having a large population of cancer and terminal illness patients, has limited palliative care infrastructure, particularly outside major urban centers. The right to die debate in India cannot be

meaningfully separated from the right to adequate pain management and end-of-life care.

This paper takes a clear position: the expansion of any legal right to die must be accompanied by, and indeed preceded by, substantial investment in palliative care services. The goal of assisted dying legislation is not to provide death as a cost-effective alternative to care, but to provide a final option of last resort for those for whom all care options have been exhausted. In jurisdictions where palliative care is inadequate, a right to die framework risks becoming a substitute for care rather than a complement to it.

At the same time, the existence of excellent palliative care does not eliminate the legitimate claim to assisted dying. Even with optimal palliative care, some patients experience suffering physical, psychological, or existential that cannot be adequately relieved. For these individuals, the option of a dignified, chosen death remains ethically and legally compelling.

10. Conclusion

This paper began with a patient in a hospital bed. Let us return to them. Their name is irrelevant; their condition is universal. They are you, or your parent, or your friend. They have lived a full life. They have loved, worked, laughed, and grieved. Now their body is a prison of pain. They ask for one final act of self-determination: to close the door quietly, with help, without violence or desperation.

What does the right to life demand in this moment? Not that they stay. The right to life, properly understood through decades of comparative jurisprudence and philosophical inquiry, is not a leash. It is a foundation. It ensures that no one can kill you against your will. It ensures that the state protects you from harm. It ensures that your existence is treated with dignity. But it does not and cannot force you to remain in a state that has lost all meaning for you. That would transform a right into a duty, and a duty into a cruelty. After analysing constitutional provisions, landmark judgments, empirical data from multiple jurisdictions, and the full spectrum of ethical and philosophical arguments, this paper reaches the following conclusions. First, the right to life and a limited right to die are not inherently contradictory; they are two expressions of the same underlying value of human dignity. Second, the expansion of the right to die, where it has occurred in carefully regulated form, has not produced the catastrophic abuses predicted by critics. Third, the trend in international human rights law and comparative constitutional jurisprudence is unmistakably toward greater recognition of individual autonomy in end-of-life decisions. Fourth, a framework built on the five principles articulated in this paper, presumption of life, rigorous capacity assessment, threshold of suffering, voluntary medical participation, and mandatory transparency, can provide meaningful protection against abuse while respecting the autonomy of persons facing irreversible suffering.

India stands at a significant juncture. The Common Cause decision of 2018 represents a bold and compassionate step that aligns Indian constitutional jurisprudence with global trends. The next step, potentially expanding the scope of advance directives, improving enforcement mechanisms, investing massively in palliative care, and ultimately revisiting the question of physician-assisted dying, requires not just judicial courage but legislative will and social conversation. The right to life and the right to die are not enemies. They are two sides of the same human dignity: the freedom to live, and the freedom, when life becomes unlivable, to say goodbye with grace. A mature legal system does not hide from hard questions. It builds frameworks that respect both the miracle of existence and the reality of unbearable suffering. That is the challenge and the obligation of constitutional law in the twenty-first century.

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